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CORPORATIONS - SHAREHOLDERS - DELEGATION OF DIRECTOR'S PRINCIPAL
DUTIES INSUFFICIENT TO INVALIDATE A VOTING TRUST-The directors of an
intermediate unit in a string of holding companies caused the corporation's
sole substantial asset, the stock representing control of a subordinate holding company, to be deposited in a voting trust. Most of these directors,
serving one-year terms, comprised the majority of the trustees who were to
serve for the life of the ten-year trust. This act served to insulate the lower
companies from the control of plaintiffs who were majority shareholders
of the top holding company. The plaintiffs sought an injunction restraining the use by the trustees of the stock controlled by the trust to effect a
merger of Theodore Gary and Co., one of the lower controlled companies,
with General Telephone Co., the largest independent telephone company
in the nation,1 and asked for the invalidation of the voting trust. Disregarding the stated purpose for the trust, i.e., the maintenance of management stability to aid the refinancing of a lower company, the plaintiffs
charged that the delegation of duties by the directors and the resulting
self-perpetuation of control were conditions which should invalidate the
voting trust. The Delaware Court of Chancery denied plaintiff's motion
for injunctive relief. On appeal, held, affirmed. Absent a showing of abuse
or fraud by the directors, the delegation of principal duties and possibility
of extended control via the trust instrument are not conditions sufficient
to invalidate an otherwise lawful voting trust. Adams v. Clearance Corp.,
(Del. 1956) 121 A. (2d) 302.
Voting trusts have outlived the stigma earlier attached to them and are
now, by decision or legislation, generally recognized as valid instruments

1 Plaintiff's interests, by reason of the merger, were cast in a minority role in the resulting company.
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of corporate management. 2 The requirement of a lawful purpose is the
principal limitation on the use of such trusts today,3 and because of the
lack of affirmative guidance by the statutes,4 the validity of a particular
trust seems to depend on the reviewing court's view of "lawful purpose" and
wise "public policy."5 Insofar as the instant case recognized the validity of
a voting trust where no fraudulent purpose has been revealed, it does not
seem vulnerable to attack; but it does pose a question of the extent to
which a court will hold other conditions insufficient to invalidate the
trust. Among "other grounds" for invalidation which have been employed
are statutory compliance requirements which test the necessary degree of
adherence to the terms of the corporation laws.6 Voting trusts which contemplate a period of duration exceeding that permitted by statute (usually
ten years) may be declared void.7 Likewise, the policy against restrictions
on alienation of trust certificates has led to the abrogation of othenvise
sound voting trusts.8 A voting trust has been approved, however, even
where the use made by the trustees of corporate funds would have been an
ultra vires act if done by the corporation,o and apparently avoidance of the
effects of governmental regulation is sufficiently compatible with the "public policy" favoring voting trusts to escape criticism.10 In the principal
case the court was required to choose between the policy against delegation

See Mannheimer v. Keehn, 41 N.Y.S. (2d) 542 at 548 (1943). See generally LEAvrrr,
VOTING TRUST (1940); 105 A.L.R. 123 (1936); 28 GEO. L. J. 1121 (1940). For resume
of leading articles tracing the growth of the voting trust, see Giles, "Is the Voting Trust
Agreement a Dangerous Instrumentality?" 3 CATH. L. REv. 81 (1953).
3 See 105 A.L.R. 123 at 129 (1936); 5 FLETCHER, Cvc. CoRP., perm. ed., §2081 (1952).
Ballentine in "Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regulation,'' 21 TEX. L. REv. 139 at 152
(1942), lists various lawful purposes.
4 See Ballentine, "Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regulation,'' 21 TEX. L. REv.
139 at 157 (1942). See also 42 !LL. L. REv. 401 (1947).
5 See Herman v. Dereszewski, 312 Mich. 244, 20 N.W. (2d) 176 (1945); Boericke v.
Weise, 68 Cal. App. (2d) 407, 156 P. (2d) 781 (1945).
6 Leading case on strict compliance is Matter of Morse, 247 N.Y. 290, 160 N.E. 374
(1928). But see Herman v. Derezewski, note 5 supra. For excellent discussion see 44 MICH.
L. REv. 1048 (1946). On extension failure see Belle Isle Corp. v. Corcoran, 29 Del. Ch.
554, 49 A. (2d) 1 (1946), but see Oppenheimer v. Cassidy, 345 Ill. App. 212, 102 N.E.
(2d) 678 (1951).
7 The entire trust may be void, Perry v. Mo.-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del. Ch. 33,
191 A. 823 (1937); partially invalid, Kittinger v. Churchill Evangelistic Assn., 151 Misc. 350,
271 N.Y.S. 510 (1934); or perhaps valid for statutory period and thereafter common law
limitations govern, 25 CoL. L. REv. 95I (1925). Cf. Boyle v. John M. Smyth Co., 248 Ill.
App. 57 (1929) (possible fifty-year period approved).
8 Tracey v. Franklin, 30 Del. Ch. 407, 61 A. (2d) 780 (1948), affd. 31 Del. Ch. 477, 67 A.
(2d) 56 (1949). For the suggestion that a reasonable suspension incidental to the voting
trust would be valid see 16 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 742 (1949). However, when incidental
to the maintenance of constant management, restrictions allowing a transfer with a waiver
of voting rights may not be fatal to the arrangement, see Trefethen v. Amazeen, 93 N.H.
110, 36 A. (2d) 266 (1944).
9 Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897 (1935) (good faith controlling).
10 See Aldridge v. Franco Wyoming Oil Co., 24 Del. Ch. 126, 7 A. (2d) 753 (1939);
affd. 24 Del. Ch. 349, 14 A. (2d) 380 (1940); Byllesby Co. v. Doriot, 25 Del. Ch. 46, 12 A.
(2d) 603 (1940).
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of directors' principal duties11 · and legislation permitting the use of voting
trusts12 and relied upon its interpretation of public policy in recognizing
the superiority of the voting trust statute where its application was not
tainted with fraud.13 The decision is an example of the extreme lengths
to which a particular court's view of sound public policy can be carried to
justify a desire to continue present management.1 4 It would seem that the
purpose of the holding company, i.e., whether nominal or real control is
contemplated, and the nature of the duties delegated, i.e., whether they are
ministerial in nature or require the exercise of considerable discretion,
should be strong considerations in fixing boundaries for the valid use of
such voting trusts.15 Notwithstanding the disturbance surrounding the duty
delegation issue and the sophisticated view taken on the lesser important
self-perpetuation aspect,16 the court's approach in the principal case is not
shocking in the context of liberal modem treatment of voting trusts, and
the decision is understandable as a result of inadequate guidance by the
legislature. Appeals for comprehensive statutory treatment which would
assure more complete protection and furnish affirmative policy guidance
in voting trust cases have been numerous.11 Piecemeal judicial legislation,
a less desirable alternative, has proved itself unsatisfactorily cumbersome in
the voting trust area. Until aid from the legislature is forthcoming, little
more should be expected from the courts in the way of judicial limitations
than those based on fraud or other specifically illegal purposes.

Gerald D. Rapp

11 "The business of every corporation • . • shall be managed by a board of directors .
• . ." Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §141 (a).
12 ". • • stockholders may • • • deposit capital stock . . • with or transfer . . . to . • •
any person ••. authorized to act as trustee •.. the right to vote. . . ." Del. Code A~n.
(1953) tit. 8, §218 (a).
13 But cf. Knickerbocker Inv. Co. v. Voorhees, 100 App. Div. 414, 91 N.Y.S. 816 (1905),
distinguished in the principal case.
14 Cf. Ecclestone v. Indialantic, Inc., 319 Mich. 248, 29 N.W. (2d) 679 (1947); 47
MICH. L. R.Ev. 547 (1949); 61 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1062 (1948) (permitting, without the aid of a
trust, the divorce of voting rights from legal and equitable ownership to preserve constant
management).
15 For criticism of the court's decision in the principal case, see 69 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1321
(1956); 104 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 712 (1956).
16 Cf. Boyle v. John M. Smyth Co., note 7 supra.
17 LEAvrrr, THE VOTING Tuusr 159-180 (1940); Ballentine, "Voting Trusts, Their
Abuses and Regulation," 21 Tm.:. L. R.Ev. 139 (1942); Giles, "Is the Voting Trust Agreement a Dangerous Instrumentality?" 3 CAm. L. R.Ev. 81 (1953).

